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COMMENT
Immigration Law and the Criminal Alien: A Comparison
of Policies for Arbitrary Deportations of Legal Permanent
Residents Convicted of Aggravated Felonies
Introduction
For the permanent resident alien in the United States, criminal activity is dangerous
business. A multitude of pitfalls awaits the alien who violates United States law.
Conviction of an aggravated felony can be a grounds for inadmission or deportation,
can eliminate the alien's right to affirmative relief from removal, and can even
disqualify him from naturalization. Since the 1980s, Congress has paid particular
attention to criminal aliens, expanding inadmissibility and deportation grounds,
decreasing the availability of discretionary relief, and narrowing the procedures
involved in some criminal removal procedures. The matter is further complicated by
the number of actors involved in making immigration policy. All three branches of
government actively participate in various aspects of immigration. Congress
determines immigration law and the removal grounds for resident aliens. The
Department of State and Department of Justice, particularly the Attorney General, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Executive Office of
Immigration Review (EOIR), carry out the bulk of congressional wishes. Finally, the
courts review the constitutionality of the actions of those who make and enforce
immigration policy. Not surprisingly, the particular agendas of each branch do not
necessarily coincide, and often these branches pursue contradictory policies,
sometimes within themselves. Even more complex is how this practice affects
regional areas.
In an attempt to shed light on the direction and focus of immigration law in
relation to arbitrary deportations of aliens convicted of aggravated felonies, this paper
discusses decisions each branch has made. Part I deals with the history of removal
law since 1988, tracing specifically the definition of aggravated felony as it has
expanded to enormous proportions. Part II looks at legislative intent within the last
decade in light of the rise in alien criminal population in United States prisons and
Congress' specific attempt to alleviate the problem. Part III discusses administrative
decisions and the administration's inability to make direct policy, which swings from
rigid adherence to legislative intent on the one hand, to the other extreme of
acceptance of extraordinary cases that necessitate deviation from traditional
deportation decisions. Part IV examines judicial decisions and the courts' hesitation
to support wholeheartedly congressional desire. Contrary to congressional wishes, the
courts have allowed for at least procedural due process rights of resident aliens. Part
V addresses particular cases and policy within the Tenth Circuit and addresses which
direction the Tenth Circuit has taken on similar issues in immigration law in
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comparison with Congress, the executive branch, and the other courts. Part VI
analyzes the various agendas of each branch and offers some suggestions about how
to balance congressional wishes, the demands on the executive branch, and the
protections available in the courts. In addition, various windows of relief for the
aggravated felon facing deportation are examined.
L History of Removal Law Since 1988
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA)' introduced the concept of "a-
ggravated felony" to the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 (NA).2 For the
first time, aggravated felonies constituted a separate basis for deportability under the
INA? This provision for deportability is significant because, unlike the grounds for
removal for crimes involving moral turpitude, convictions for aggravated felonies
need not be committed within five years from admission. Such convictions can affect
a resident alien throughout his lifetime, and without regard to the potential or actual
sentence. Thus, an alien may receive a suspended sentence or part-term sentence, but
his crime will still fall under the characterization of aggravated felony. The ADAA
defined aggravated felony as "murder, any drug trafficking crime... or any illicit
trafficking in any firearms or destructive devices ... or any attempt or conspiracy
to commit any such act, committed within the United States."4 This list was modest,
but was the first to include drug offenses. There remained confusion, though, as to
whether a conviction must occur after the enactment of the ADAA for the ADAA
to apply to deportation hearings.' Congress later expressly addressed this confusion
by making the Act retroactive for automatic stays of deportation.6
The ADAA, in addition to the aggravated felony definition, decreased the
procedural availabilities for aggravated felons. Section 7347 mandated expeditious
proceedings, requiring that the proceedings be completed before the alien is released
from his current sentence.7 Following release from the alien's sentence until the
conclusion of the deportation hearing, the Attorney General had to take the
aggravated felon into custody.' Other limitations on the aggravated alien felon's
rights included the elimination of voluntary departure,9 the creation of a presumption
1. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43) (1994).
2. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
3. See DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES § 7.4, at
7-55 (1991).
4. ADAA § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469-70.
5. See Brian Hayes, Matter of AA-: The Board of immigration Appeals'Statutory Misinterpretation
Denies Discretionary Relief to Aggravated Felons, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 247, 253 (1993).
6. See Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-232, § 306(a)(13), 105 Stat. 1733, 1751 (1991) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note
(Supp. III 1991)); see aL-o Berreiro v. INS, 989 F.2d 62, 64 (Ist Cir. 1993).
7. See ADAA § 7347.
8. See ADAA § 734,3(a).




of deportability,0 and the reduction of the time period in which an aggravated felon
may appeal from six months to sixty days." The ADAA also prohibited a deported
aggravated felon from applying for admission to the United States for a ten-year
period. 2 Courts upheld such provisions, adhering to the established policy that
Congress has plenary power over aliens and may deport them at any time for any
reason. 3 Additionally, the ADAA does not violate the Eighth Amendment's cruel
and unusual punishment provision because deportation is not criminal in nature. 4
Two years later, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1990 (ImmAct90), which
expanded the definition of aggravated felony. 5 ImmAct90 added certain violent
crimes, illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, and money laundering, 6 and
extended the aggravated felony definition to violations of federal law, state law, and
certain foreign convictions. 7 ImmAct9O added to the definition of murder, "any
crime of violence ... for which the term of imprisonment imposed ... is at least
five years."' 8 A crime of violence is "an offense that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another, or... involves a substantial risk that physical force ... may be used in the
course of committing the offense."'9 In addition, ImmAct90 expanded the definition
of drug offenses under the definition of aggravated felony to "any illicit trafficking
in any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances
Act)."' Upon conviction of an illicit trafficking offense, the alien is then labeled an
aggravated felon.2' Other crimes, including money laundering, were also added to
the list of aggravated felonies.'
As for procedural protections, ImmAct90 decreased the availability of procedural
remedies for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. For example, ImmAct90
10. See ADAA § 7347(c).
11. See ADAA § 7347(B).
12. This is an increase from the previous requirement of five years. ADAA § 7349.
13. See Circella v. Sahli, 216 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100
YALE W. 545 (1990); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L. REV.
965 (1993); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the
Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 925 (1995).
14. See LeTourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1976).
15. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (current version at
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. III 1991)).
16. See id. § 501(a)(2), (3).
17. See id § 501(a)(4)-(6).
18. Id § 501 (a)(3).
19. Id.
20. ImmAct9O § 501 (a)(2).
21. See Hayes, surpa note 5, at 254.
22. See ImmAct9O § 501 (a)(3).
23. This list includes shortening the period for an aggravated felon to petition a court of appeal to
review a final deportation order to 30 days, ImmAct9O § 502(a), clarifying the law concerning mandatory
INS detention of aggravated felons upon release from custody, ImmAct9O § 504(a), eliminating the
presidential or gubernatorial pardon to avoid deportation, ImmAct9O § 506(a), removing the power of
a trial judge to request deportation before completion of his sentence, ImmAct9O § 505(a), precluding
1998]
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denied section 212(c) discretionary waivers which were available to an alien "who
has been convicted of an aggravated felony and has served a term of imprisonment
of at least 5 years. ' A year later, in the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration
and Naturalization Amendments of 1991 (MTINA), Congress changed the language
of section 212(c) to deny discretionary relief for multiple aggravated convictions,'
the sentences of which originally, as individual crimes, would have been insufficient
in duration to constitute the five-year sentencing requirement under ImmAct90.'
Thus, two or more smaller crimes would increase an alien's crimes to aggravated
felonies and therefore would deny an alien a discretionary waiver against deportation
proceedings.
Congress believed that the penalties were insufficiently severe to deter alien
resident crime. Three years later, in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, Congress changed the penalty for re-entry by an aggravated felon from
fifteen to twenty yearsY
Again, Congress felt that criminal penalties were insufficient for deterrence of alien
resident crime in the United States and therefore broadened the statutory definition
of "aggravated felon" in the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act
of 1994 (INTCA).28 The new definition included federal and state crimes such as
use of fire or explosives, gun related crimes, thefts and burglaries, receipt of stolen
property, RICO violations with a five-year sentence imposed, kidnaping for ransom,
child pornography, prostitution, espionage, treason, alien smuggling, and immigration
document fraud.'
With the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
Congress reduced the five-year sentence requirement for document fraud. Congress
also added commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, obstruction of justice, and
bribery crimes to the definition of aggravated felony, provided that a sentence of at
least five years was imposed." New aggravated felonies also included a second
conviction involving gambling offenses,3 transportation for prostitution, and illegal
re-entry if an alien already has a conviction for an aggravated felony. 2
the alien from benefits of voluntary departure, INA § 1254(e)(1), suspension of deportation, INA §
1254(a)(1), registry, INA § 1259, and naturalization, INA § 1427(a), eliminating automatic stays of
deportation pending judicial review, ImmAct90 § 513(a), lengthening the ban for re-entry from ten to
twenty years, ImmAct9 3 § 514(a), and barring aliens for applying for asylum, lmmAct90 § 514(a). See
Hayes, surpa, note 5, at 254.
24. lmmAct90 § 511(a).
25. See MTINA § 306(a)(10).
26. See ImmAct90 § 511(a).
27. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Title XIII, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (Supp. 11995)).
28. See Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, § 222, Pub. L. No. 103-416,
108 Stat. 4305 (1994) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. 1 1995)).
29. See id. at 4320-22.






Other procedural changes included section 414 of the AEDPA, which added that
"an alien found in the United States who has not been admitted to the United States
after inspection ... shall be subject to examination and exclusion by the Attorney
General."33 This means that anyone found in the United States not inspected will be
subject to exclusion procedures in a removal hearing, and will not be subject to
deportation proceedings.0
Also in 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA) to toughen the laws against crime. The
definition of aggravated felony was broadened to include rape and sexual abuse of
a minor. The IRAIRA also reduced the sentence for crimes of violence, theft,
receipt of stolen property, and document fraud, from a five-year minimum to a one-
year requirement. It also radically reduced the requirements for fraud, deceit, and tax
evasion." As for the applicability of the Act, the IRAIRA adds that "notwithsta-
nding any other provision of the law (including the effective date), the term
'aggravated felony' applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before,
on, or after the date of enactment of this paragraph."'
Congress wanted to shorten the deportation process in order to decrease the
number of aggravated felons in the prisons 7 IIRAIRA also provides for expedited
removal of criminal aliens, allowing for "initiation and, to the extent possible, the
completion of removal proceedings, and any administrative appeals thereof...
before the alien's release from incarceration for the underlying aggravated felony."3
This section is designed to prevent the release into society of dangerous criminal
aliens during the removal proceedings,39 and also allows for criminals to be deported
as soon as their sentences are finished.
I. Legislative Intent and Debate
Several constitutional sources arguably support broad congressional power over
immigration. Congress "may regulate commerce with foreign nations" under Article
I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution. Congress has power over migration and
importation of persons under Article I, Section 9, Clause L.' Section 8 of Article
33. AEDPA § 414.
34. See Jules E. Coven, Changes to Grounds of Exclusion and Deportation: Changed Definition
"Aggravated Felony" and New Bars for EWI's and Overstays under the Anti-terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 964 PLI/CoRP 93, 99 (1996). The significance of being subject to exclusion
proceedings and not deportation proceedings is that many of the procedural safeguards exist in the latter.
In the latter case, an alien is considered to have entered, and thus procedural due process rights begin.
A greater interest is at stake for those who have entered and are forced to leave than for those who are
attempting to enter.
35. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 321, 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1347 (1996). The dollar amount was reduced from $200,000 to $10,000. Id.
36. IIRAIRA § 321(b).
37. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., IMMIGRATION Acr OF 1990 - REPORT ON
CRIMINAL ALIENs 3, 18 (Apr. 1992) [hereinafter REPORT ON CRIMINAL ALIENS].
38. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1228(a)(3)(A) (Vest 1997).
39. See Procedure for Automatic Termination of Temporary Resident Status Upon Final Order of
Deportation or Exclusion, 8 C.F.R. § 245(a) (1995).
40. This provision was probably centrally concerned with the slave trade. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY,
1998]
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I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to "establish a uniform rule of
naturalization."'" Congress has power to declare war,42 which implies the power to
regulate who is an enemy and who is admitted. In addition, Congress has implied
powers based on the sovereignty of the United States 3 Congress has used these
powers in creating the basic framework for immigration policy, and the United States
Supreme Court has- consistently upheld this structure under the guise of the plenary
power doctrinem As discussed above, Congress passed several acts throughout this
century limiting the grounds for immigration and providing the bases for removal or
exclusion. The courts have continuously upheld the plenary powers of Congress over
immigration 5 Aliens can be deported for any reason that Congress determines is
not in the best interest of the government.
Unfortunately, ss the levels of immigration rose in the United States, so did the
levels of criminal activities attributable to these aliensf The percentage of aliens
in the prison population rose as well4 INS made suggestions to expedite the
deportation process to reduce the overall problem of prison crowding.
Congress recognized the seriousness of the criminal alien problem and the need
for stiffer penalties to combat the large number of crimes committed by aliens."
Beginning in 1988, Congress began to focus its attention on the criminal activity of
resident aliens within United States borders by passing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988 (ADAA),I which first introduced the concept of "aggravated felony" to im-
migration law and removed several procedural remedies previously available to
suspend deportation procedures. 2 Two years later, Congress passed the Immigration
Act of 1990. Congress was concerned with the low priority INS placed on the alien
criminal problem' and felt that INS did a poor job of investigating, detaining, and
deporting alien criminals from the United States&' Congress worried that aliens
were abusing the system, using meritless and frivolous arguments to delay
deportation proceedings. As a remedy, Congress sought to introduce summary
IMMIGRATION AND RE-UGEE LAW AND POLICY 10 (2d ed. 1997).
41. U.S. CONST. ,rt. I, § 8, cl. 4.
42. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
43. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936) (holding that
Congress had an extra-constitutional federal power to manage external affairs).
44. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1976).
See generally Motomura, supra note 13; Scaperlanda, supra note 13; Legomsky, supra note 13.
45. See Reno v. Fiores, 507 U.S. 292 (1992); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); McJunkin v. INS,
579 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that Congress can impose conditions on the privileges of resident
aliens that could not b. imposed on citizens).
46. See Bronsztejn v. INS, 526 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1975); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 90 F. Supp.
431 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
47. See REPORT CN CRIMINAL ALIENS, supra note 37, at 3.
48. See id. at 5.-
49. See id. at 18.
50. See 136 CONG. REC. S17, 117-118 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990).
51. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. N. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.
52. See 8 U.S.C. ' 1101(a)(43) (1994).
53. See H.R. REP. No. 101-681, at 145 (1990).




deportation procedures5 as a means of reducing the grounds for staying depor-
tations. Congress was taking great steps towards "dismissing all criminal aliens'
appeals as a matter of law."'
Continuing the trend of harsher penalties and grave reductions of procedural rights
for resident aliens convicted of aggravated felonies, Congress made broad changes
in the judicial review of deportation, exclusion, and removal under I IRA.
Congress completely eliminated section 106 of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act. This provision allowed for the review of deportation orders by the courts of
appeal through a "petition to review" and for review of exclusion orders through
district court habeas corpus proceedings.58 Congress had created two primary
mechanisms by which a legal permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felon
could be forced out of the United States ' First, he could be ordered deported by
a federal judge at a criminal sentencing hearing.' This procedure provides for direct
appeal, though the reviewing judge has little discretion when dealing with an
aggravated felon.6' Congress established a second mechanism for deportation of
criminal aliens through an administrative hearing. Here, Congress entirely removed
the availability of judicial review.' 2 The legislature created an all but irrebuttable
presumption that all aggravated felons are a "danger to the community of the United
States."' 3
Despite the overall tendency of Congress to be harsh in its treatment of convicted
aggravated felons, there has been some support for a more temperate and moderate
position dealing with convicted felons. Rep. Barney Frank (D.-Mass.) called the
congressional attitude toward deportation "inhumane, disruptive not just to
individuals, but to other countries, and wholly unjustified."' Despite this opposition,
55. See 136 CONG. REC. S17109 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990).
56. Peter Hill, Did Congress Eliminate All Judicial Review of Orders of Deportation, Exclusion, and
Removal for Criminal Aliens?, FED. LAW., Mar-Apr. 1997, at 43, 44.
57. See id. at 44-47.
58. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1994).
59. See Hill, supra note 56, at 44-45.
60. See 18 U.S.C. 3583(d) (1994).
61. See Hill, supra note 56, at 45.
62. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (1994). The statute states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any
final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed
a criminal offense covered in section 212(a)(2) or 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or
any offense covered by section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are,
without regard to their date of commission, otherwise covered by section 237(a)(2)(A)(I).
Id.
63. Hill, supra note 56, at 45 (arguing that often it is unfair to impose this standard on aliens
convicted of more minor crimes such as shoplifting, which could be part of the new aggravated felony
definition).
64. 143 CONG. REC. H7012-01 (Sept. 9, 1997). Representative Frank was writing about the potential
cruelties of a strict policy of deportation for those committing aggravated felonies. One man in a drug
recovery center was charged with possession of heroin in 1989. This man had been in the United States
almost his entire life, had contributed much, had just had an accident in a factory, and had committed
no other crimes. He was being deported, which would have put an extreme hardship on him and his
1998]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
the courts consistently note that Congress remains true to the general intent of
facilitating the deportation of undesirable aliens. Currently, the majority in
Congress has been more than pleased with the direction immigration policy has
taken, expressing strong support for new programs that successfully identify and
deport criminal aliens in city detention facilities. This support has included Rep.
Ron Packard's (D.-Cal.) backlash against Janet Reno's suspension of a large number
of deportation proceedings despite a congressional mandate to the contrary.67
President Clinton recently proposed the Immigration Reform Transition Act of
1997 (IRTA) in an effort to ensure the complete transition to the new cancellation
of removal provision of the IIRAIRA.' Clinton urged that the legislation would
protect various foreign interests and aid relief from unfair decisions for individuals
directly affected by the removal of protection from deportation under the URAIRA.'
Il. Administrative Decisions
In thb Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1990 (ImmAct90), Congress
delegated additionad authority to the executive branch on issues of immigration. 0
Courts have consistently held that the power of expelling aliens, an essential power
of the legislative and executive branches of government, may be freely exercised
through the executive branch.7! ' The Department of Justice has the power and burden
of administrating and enforcing the Immigration and Naturalization Act and "all other
laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens.' More specifically,
the Attorney General has the power to delegate responsibilities to lesser agencies
within the Department of Justice.' Therefore, much of the day-to-day duties of
immigration fall to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Activities such as
handling visa petitions, adjustments of status (e.g., from nonimmigrant to immigrant),
and both deportation and exclusion procedures are handled by the INS. However, the
INS does not have complete control over every aspect of immigration. Both the
immigration courts 4 and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which are bodies
independent from the INS, handle the bulk of immigration review." The im-
migration courts p:-eside over removal hearings and may participate in rescinding
family and there was no remedy available to him for review. Frank argues that surely Congress did not
mean to punish such p ople.
65. See Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 1968).
66. See 143 CONG. REC. H2617-02 (May 14, 1997).
67. See 143 CONG. REc. E1439-02 (July 16, 1997).
68. See 143 CONG. REC. H5775-01 (July 24, 1997).
69. See 143 CONG. REC. H5775-01 (July 24, 1997); 143 CONG. REC. S8089-05 (July 24, 1997).
70. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994) ("The Attorney General shall be charged with the administration
and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of
aliens.").
71. See Circella v. Sahli, 216 F.2d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1954).
72. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 103(a), 66 Stat. 163, 173.
73. See id. § 103.
74. See id. § 1010))(4).




adjustments of status.76 Their decisions are final unless appealed to the BIA.7 The
BIA mainly handles immigration judges' decisions on removal' The Attorney
General may review decisions of the BIA which the Chair or majority of the Board
refers for review, which the Commissioner of the INS refers for review, and which
the Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him.7
The Immigration Act of 1990 gives the Attorney General the authority to deport
undesirable aliens.' Deportation of certain criminal aliens became compulsory under
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(I) and 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B)(4). Additionally, the
Attorney General is not to deport any person when the deportation would threaten his
life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion."' Consistent with its concern over the rise in
aggravated felonies, Congress created one exception to this rule. The Attorney
General may deport an alien in spite of a threat to his life or liberty if he finds that
the alien convicted of a particularly serious crime "constitutes a danger to the
community of the United States. '
Recently, the INS has responded to attacks concerning gross inefficiencies in
finding, processing, and deporting criminal alien felons.' In addition, unusually
lengthy deportation proceedings often leave criminals incarcerated long after
completion of their sentences.' In response to these criticisms and to the growing
concerns over the amount of crime committed by permanent resident aliens, the INS
began the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP) to remove criminal aliens
from the United States in a quick and efficient manner.'
Unlike Congress, which has continually pursued the single goal of increasing
deportations by expanding the criminal grounds for removal, the executive
department, represented by the Attorney General, the INS, the BIA, and the
immigration courts, is less successful in maintaining one consistent policy. One area
in which the INS, the BIA, and the Attorney General have pursued conflicting goals
is the nature, both procedural and substantive, of the 212(c) discretionary waiver for
relief. Legal permanent residents, whether or not they had previous convictions of
crimes, had enjoyed the possibility of a waiver of exclusion or deportation under
section 212(c) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act if they had a "lawful
unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years in the United States."' The
76. See INA § 246.
77. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.36, 3.37 (1998).
78. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.21, 3.1(b)(1), (2) (1998).
79. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1998).
80. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1451 (1994).
81. See id. § 1253(h)(1).
82. Id. § 1253(h)(2)(B).
83. See KENNETH Y. GEMAN, IMPORTANT NEW AsYLuM REGULATIONS (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac.
Course Handbook Series No. 515, 1994).
84. See Evangeline G. Gabriel, Presumed Ineligible: The Effect of Criminal Convictions on
Applications for Asylum and Withholding Under Section 515 of the Immigration Act of 1990, 6 GEO.
IMMIGR. LJ. 27, 42 (1992).
85. See INS Increases Efforts Against Criminal Aliens, 65 INTERPRETER RELEAsEs 955, 955 (1988).
86. INA § 212(c) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)); see also Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.
1998]
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Immigration Act of 1990, however, limited the 212(c) waiver, making it unavailable
for legal permanent residents who committed an aggravated felony and had served
at least five years for the crime." In 1996, Congress passed the AEDPA 8 Section
440(d) of AEDPA bars section 212(c) relief for aliens "deportable by reason of
having committed any criminal offense,"' which includes an aggravated felony,
regardless of the .,entence imposed or served. Immediately after the passage of the
AEDPA, the INS argued that section 440(d) applied "in all pending and subsequently
initiated deportation cases, regardless of whether the conduct or events triggering the
section's restrictions predated the AEDPA."'  The BIA rejected the position of the
INS, holding that section 440(d) may not be applied retroactively to an alien who
sought 212(c) relief before the enactment of the AEDPA.' The Attorney General,
on petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, concluding that section 440(d)
should be applied to all pending 212(c) cases, since "nothing in the language of the
newly enacted statute specifies either that it is to be applied in pending deportation
proceedings, or &tat it is not to be."' To solve this dilemma, Congress repealed
section 212(c) by the IIRAIRA,9 replacing 212(c) with a new form of prospective
relief called cancellation of removal. 9
The BIA not only floundered in its consideration of the procedural aspects of the
212(c) discretionary waiver, but it also had trouble in establishing consistent policy
for substantive 212(c) relief waiver considerations for aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies. For example, in a series of decisions, the BIA indicated that aggravated
felons were eligible for 212(c) waivers. In In re MeZa,9s the BIA held that because
the definition of aggravated felony "refers to several types or categories of
offenses .... [the respondent] is not precluded from establishing eligibility for section
212(c) relief based on his conviction for an aggravated felony."" In In re Marin,9
the BIA held that 212(c) relief is not granted by a mere showing of eligibility, but
remains a discretionary matter for the Attorney General. 8 In In re Roberts," the
BIA required "a balancing of the social and humane considerations presented in an
alien's favor again:st the adverse factors evidencing his undesirability as a permanent
1976) (holding that the section 212(c) waiver is available for both exclusion and deportation
proceedings).
87. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 511(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5052, amended
by the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, § 306(a)(10),
Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733, 1751.
88. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
89. .AEDPA § 440(d).
90. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
91. See generally In re Soriano, Int. Dec. 3289, 3289 (B.I.A. June 27, 1996).
92. Id. at 3294.
93. IIRAIRA § 304(b).
94. See id. § 304(a)(3).
95. 20 I. & N. Dec. 257 (B.I.A. 1991).
96. Id. at 259-60.
97. 16 1. & N. Dec. 581, 581 (B.I.A. 1978).
98. See id. at 582-83.




resident."'"I Although an aggravated felony conviction is an adverse factor in
gaining 212(c) relief, aggravated felons may show positive factors demonstrating the
need for relief, though it is not necessary to meet heightened standards merely
because the offense constitutes an aggravated felony."' The BIA will also look at
incarceration and rehabilitation as discretionary factors."
The BIA took a different position on the substantive nature of 212(c) discretionary
waivers in several other cases. In In re Edwards,"°3 the BIA held that the conviction
of a violent crime or drug offense requires a higher showing of unusual or
outstanding circumstances to warrant discretionary relief under 212(c). ° In
addition, a showing of rehabilitation is often required. 5 The BIA also considered
when a conviction must have occurred in order for an aggravated alien felon to be
disqualified from the 212(c) relief waiver in In re A-A-." In this case, the INS
began deportation proceedings against a permanent resident alien convicted of murder
prior to enactment of the ADAA." The respondent sought section 212(c)"'" relief,
which the judge denied in his exercise of judicial discretion." On appeal, the BIA
held that "the aggravated felony definition applied retroactively to all ADAA-defined
aggravated felonies, and that as such, the bar to 212(c) relief also applied to all such
convictions.""' This decision of the BIA was the first to hold that the definition of
aggravated felony applied retroactively to all ADAA crimes, and therefore any
conviction barred 212(c) relief."'
IV. Judicial Decisions
The courts have firmly established Congress' plenary power over immigration."
Although the judiciary does not generally question Congress' wisdom in providing
for deportation of certain classes of aliens,"' there is a presumption that Congress
did not completely preclude judicial review of administrative actions."' The United
100. liL at 297.
101. See itt at 298.
102. See In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 588.
103. 20 I. & N. Dec. 191 (B.I.A. 1990).
104. See id. at 194.
105. See id.
106. 20 I. & N. Dec. 492 (B.I.A. 1992).
107. See hi at 493.
108. Section 212(c) was repealed in Pub. L. No. 104-208, Did. C, Tite III, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-
597 (1996).
109. See In re A-A-, 20 I. & N. at 493.
110. Hayes, supra note 5, at 250.
111. See id.
112. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (recognizing an inherent
federal power to exclude aliens); Nishimura Eldu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 655 (1892) (rejecting
due process limits on the exercise of that power); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 699
(1893) (extending the principle of Chae Chan Ping and Nishimura Ekiu to both deportation and
exclusion).
113. See United States ex reL Avramovich v. Lehmann, 235 F.2d 260, 262 (6th Cir. 1956).
114. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1985).
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States Supreme Court has also held in favor of "restrict[ed] access to judicial review
only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence of a contrary legislative
intent...... Congress did limit the availability of judicial review, however, in cases
of administrative removal hearings when an alien is convicted of an aggravated
felony'
16
This decision has serious impacts. Under the DIRAIRA, the presumption that all
aggravated felons have been convicted of a particularly serious crime and are a
"danger to the community" is apparently irrebuttable."7 This means that upon a
conviction of an aggravated felony, a permanent resident alien is not entitled to
judicial review, except in extraordinary situations. The Seventh Circuit in Garcia v.
[ivS,"u affirmed this position, holding that Congress clearly intended absolutely to
bar aggravated felons entirely from receiving a stay of deportation.""
Congress has delegated the question of what constitutes a "danger to the
community" to the Attorney General. Under this delegation, the Attorney General has
the sole authority to regulate offenses and interpret statutes as to the extent that it
will render an alien to be a danger to the community if convicted of an aggravated
felony." Since those convicted of aggravated felonies are denied discretionary
waivers, only the 212(h) extreme hardship waiver is available, and only under an
extremely limited number of circumstances.' The extreme hardship waivers under
section 212(h), however, are also not eligible for appeal, because "no court shall have
jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver
under this subsection.'"" Thus, an alien is without judicial remedy if the Attorney
General concludes that no extreme hardship exists and allows deportation proceedings
to continue.
Not every decision of the executive branch allows such protections against judicial
review. When the courts are called upon to interpret, for example, a decision made
by the Board of Immigration Appeals or the INS, a question arises: In light of the
statute, how much deference should be given to the administrative decision? The
115. Id. at 671.
116. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252 (a)(2)(B), 1252(a)(2)(C) (1994).
117. Hill, supra note 56, at 45.
118. 7 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1993).
119. See id.
120. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(C) (1994).
121. Section 212() provides:
No waiver shall be provided under this subsection in the case of an alien who has been
convicted of (or who has admitted committing acts that constitute) murder or criminal acts
involving torture, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit murder or a criminal act
involving torture. No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien
who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence if either since the date of such admission the alien has been
convicted of an aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully resided continuously in
the United States for a period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of
the initiation of proceedings to remove the alien from the United States.
INA § 212(h).




level of deference given to an administrative interpretation of law typically involves
a double inquiry." The court must first decide whether to apply the ad-
ministration's statutory construction124 or whether the question falls within the sole
province of the judiciary."z If the agency decision is one of policy, the court must
defer to any "reasonable" agency decisions." On the other hand, questions of
statutory construction are within the province of the judiciary, because "it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is."'"2 In addition, any action taken by an administrative agency can be reviewed
under an arbitrary and capricious test.'2 This test requires that an administrative
action be upheld "if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain" the agency's decision.' Essentially, if Congress' intent is clear, then it is
the court's job to enforce that intent.
In an overwhelming number of deportation cases involving aggravated alien felons,
the courts have favored complete deference to executive interpretations of legislation,
provided the interpretation is reasonable. In Cepero v. Board of Immigration
Appeals,' the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas gave deference to the
BIA's interpretation of the phrase "particularly serious crime," despite the absence of
a definition of the phrase in the statute.' In Al-Salehi v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service,' the Tenth Circuit held that where Congress has not spoken
clearly, the agency's interpretation should be given deference and should stand if it
is reasonable.' Only in unreasonable cases would judicial interpretation be
justified. In Mosquera-Perez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,"3 the First
Circuit gave deference to the agency charged with interpretation of the statute when
123. See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 155,
124. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The Court held that
[w]hen a court reviews an agency's construction of a statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the Court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction of the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute.
Id.
125. See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 155.
126. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
127. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
128. See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 156.
129. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935).
130. 882 F. Supp. 1575 (Kan. 1995).
131. See id. at 1576.
132. 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995).
133. See id. at 392-93.
134. 3 F.3d 553 (Ist Cir. 1993).
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the statute was silent on the issue.'35 The Eleventh Circuit used a slightly different
test in U.S. v. Chukwura,'" holding that unless the language of a statute would lead
to absurd results, its plain meaning controls.'37 In Bedoya-Valencia v. Immigration
& Naturalization Service,' the court gave deference to the Attorney General when
"he articulated a determination not to depart further from the statutory text, and the
absence of any constitutional mandate to do so."'" Clearly, the courts are willing
to defer to administrative interpretations of statutory language when that interpretation
is reasonable, and when policy decisions are delegated to the executive branch by
Congress in absence of clear language within the statute.
However, court,; have not blindly followed every agency's interpretation of
immigration statutes. The courts faced the problem of the reasonableness of the
Attorney General's decision to make section 440(d) of the AEDPA retroactive. This
decision effectively denied 212(c) discretionary waivers to those aliens convicted of
aggravated felonie; who were previously eligible and had applied for the 212(c)
waivers. In Mojica v. Reno," the court overturned the Attorney General's decision
on the retroactivity of section 440(d). Using the test set forth in Landgraf v. USI
Film Products,4' the Court considered steps the judiciary must take in order to
determine the temporal effect of the 440(d) provision. First, courts should examine
the statutory provision to ascertain if any constitutional bars to retroactive implemen-
tation exist.4 Courts should then determine if the statute expresses a congressional
design favoring retroactivity.4 If neither is present, then the court must interpret
the statute against retroactivity.'" Applying this standard, the court in Mojica v.
Reno found that Congress expressed no clear intent in favor of retroactivity in section
440(d) of the AEDPA.
Additionally, constitutional barriers may prevent retroactivity.4 ' Consequently,
the government cannot prevent application for 212(c) waivers nor prevent timely filed
212(c) applications from being determined on the merits.'" The Supreme Court
found that the due process requirement for retroactive legislation is "conditioned upon
a rationality requir.ment beyond that applied to other legislation."'47 The Mojico
court found that Congress offered no purpose for a retroactive application of 440(d)
and that the statute did not expressly provide for retroactivity.' The BIA strongly
135. See id. at 556.
136. 5 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1993).
137. See id. at 1423.
138. 6 F.3d 891 (2nd Cir. 1993).
139. Id. at 897.
140. 970 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. N.Y. 1997).
141. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
142. See id. at 247.
143. See id
144. See id
145. See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 168.
146. See id. at 169,
147. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 223 (1988).




criticized the Attorney General's opinion in In re Soriano,'49 which offered
absolutely no rationale for her decision to make the rule retroactive."5 Deference
to administrative agencies is typically the rule unless retroactivity is involved in
deportation matters.
Traditionally, courts have taken a dim view of the congressional harshness in
deportation cases. Courts consider deportation to a country to which a legal
permanent resident has not been since his childhood and in which he has no friends
or family to be extremely severe. Justice Black wrote that "to banish [an immigrant]
from home, family, and adopted country is punishment of the most drastic kind."'
5
This is not to say that courts view deportation as punishment. On the contrary, courts
consistently hold that deportation proceedings are not criminal in nature, and
therefore retroactivity provisions do not violate the constitutional ban on ex post facto
laws" and are not cruel or unusual punishment.' However, courts impose on a
criminal defense counsel a duty to advise his alien client of the consequences of a
guilty plea to immigration." The Mojica court noted that thirteen states require
deportation advisories in a criminal plea.'55
Courts have, however, followed Congress' harshness in other areas, often
construing language against the defendant alien. The Fifth Circuit held that an
indeterminate sentence of four to ten years qualified as being a term of imprisonment
for at least five years under United States Sentencing Guidelines section
2L1.2(b)(2)." The Eighth Circuit found that "indeterminate sentences have long
been held sentences for the maximum term for which the defendant might be
imprisoned."'"
In Kofa v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,"'x the Fourth Circuit considered
whether eligibility for withholding of deportation requires a separate determination
of "dangerousness to the community" for an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.
The court stated that if the court is construing a statute which has been construed by
an agency, then under Chevron, the court is obligated to follow the two-prong
test. 9 In doing so, the court held that Congress' intent was clear. No separate
determination of dangerousness to the community is warranted; 6 an alien is simply
barred from discretionary relief upon conviction of an aggravated felony.
149. In re Soriano, Int. Dec. 3289 (Feb. 21, 1997).
150. See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 169.
151. Lehmann v. United States ex rel Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 691 (1957) (Black, J., concurring).
152. See United States ex reL Carson v. Kershner, 228 F.2d 142, 146 (6th Cir. 1955).
153. See LeTourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1976).
154. See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 177; Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461,465-66 (2d Cir. 1974).
155. See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 177.
156. See United States v. Quinonez-Terrazas, 86 F.3d 382, 383 (5th Cir. 1996).
157. See Baughman v. United States, 450 F.2d 1217, 1220 (8th Cir. 1971).
158. 60 F.3d 1084, 1086. (4th Cir. 1995).
159. See id. at 1087-88; see supra note 124.
160. See Kofa, 60 F.3d at 1095.
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V. Tenth Circuit and Oklahoma Cases
The Tenth Circuit and the Oklahoma Supreme Court have had many opportunities
to adjudicate deportation questions. One of the policies the courts profess to follow
is that of construing deportation statutes in favor of the alien. This position was
articulated by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Quintana,' in which the court
held that "statutes relating to deportation of aliens are liberally construed in favor of
the alien concerned as the deportation penalty can be harsh."'" Despite this
language, recent cases demonstrate a clear trend not to follow this policy, but to defer
to the INS and the BIA's statutory interpretations, virtually never siding with the
petitioning alien.
Throughout 1995, the Tenth Circuit generally upheld congressional intent,
maintaining a strict adherence to a policy presumptively against the permanent
resident alien convicted of an aggravated felony, despite the earlier Quintana
decision." The court dealt with several issues concerning deportation of aggravated
felons. The issues included whether there is an absolute bar to withholding of
deportation after a criminal conviction,'" whether an aggravated felon could compel
the Attorney General to initiate deportation proceedings,'" whether persecution in
one's home county mitigated the bar against relief waiver," whether an indeter-
minate sentence constituted an aggravated felony, 61 and whether an alien already
deported after a felony conviction had standing to sue.'" As to each issue, the
Tenth Circuit ruled against the criminal alien.'"
In 1996, the Tenth Circuit followed the trend of pure deference to established INS
and BIA policy. The court considered various issues including the temporal
significance of the ADAA definition of "aggravated felony,"'" whether the district
court could order deportation as a condition of supervised release,'' whether
Miranda warnings were necessary in INS deportation proceedings," whether a
defendant's rights were violated when an immigration judge refused to hear asylum
and withholding of deportation claims," and whether the law relating to illegal re-
entry after deportation based on aggravated felony conviction constituted sentence
161. 914 F.2d 1409 (10th Cir. 1990).
162. Id. at 1410; se also INS, v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966) (holding that doubts as to the
correct construction of a deportation statute are generally resolved in favor of the alien).
163. See Quintana, 914 F.2d at 1409.
164. See generally AI-Salehi v. INS, 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995).
165. See generally Hernandez-Avalos v. INS, 50 F.3d 842 (10th Cir. 1995).
166. See generally Cepero v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 882 F. Supp. 1575 (D. Kan. 1995).
167. See generally Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 53 F.3d 310 (10th Cir. 1995).
168. See id. at 311.
169. See Nguyen, 53 F.3d at 311; Hernandez-Avalos, 50 F.3d at 848; Al-Salehi, 47 F.3d at 391;
Cepero, 882 F. Supp. at 1579.
170. See United States v. Cabremra-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996).
171. See generally United States v. Phommachanh, 91 F.3d 1383 (10th Cir. 1996).
172. See generally United States v. Montoya-Robles, 935 F. Supp. 1196 (D.C. Utah 1996).




enhancement.'74 In all cases, the court decided against the alien petitioner, showing
preference for deference to administrative decisions.75
In 1997, the Tenth Circuit continued its line of decisions in two major areas,
determinations of aggravated felony in relation to illegal re-entry after depor-
tation,"6 and prohibition of review of deportation order following conviction of an
aggravated felony." In all cases, the Tenth Circuit ruled against the criminal
alien.'78
A. Notification of Rights or Obligations
Notification of rights and obligations is significant in deportation procedures,
especially in light of the fact that the defendants are aliens, facing an unfamiliar
immigration law. Often aliens do not have adequate English language skills to
understand the laws or the proceedings. In addition, deportation has been held to be
a civil matter; thus, many of the protections, such as Miranda warnings, do not
apply."' On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that some level of
procedural due process is required."u The amount of due process, therefore,
remains unanswered. The following Tenth Circuit cases reflect a limited view of
procedural due process.
In United States v. Montoya-Robles,"' the court questioned whether an ag-
gravated felon was entitled to Miranda warnings before or during deportation
proceedings. The court held that the defendant had no Miranda rights before or
during deportation proceedings because Miranda rights are prophylactic measures to
protect a person's right against self-incrimination."
In United States v. Lopez-Serrato, the defendant was charged with illegal re-
entry after deportation upon conviction of an aggravated felony - possession of
marijuana. The defendant argued that he did not receive a form notifying him of
penalties for re-entry at the time of deportation, although the defendant had been
deported and given notice three times earlier. The court concluded that no one has
the right to commit a crime, and the due process clause only protects those with a
174. See generally United States v. Valdez, 103 F.3d 95 (10th Cir. 1996).
175. See Valdez, 103 F.3d at 97; Aranda-Hernandez, 95 F.3d at 980; Phomnmachanh, 91 F.3d at
1386; Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d at 1001; Montoya-Roubles, 935 F. Supp. at 1201.
176. See generally United States v. Lopez-Serrato, No. 97-4017 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished
decision listed in table at 120 F.3d 271); United States v. Anaya, 117 F.3d 447 (10th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Cisneros-Cabrera, 110 F.3d 746 (10th Cir. 1997).
177. See generally Grieveson v. INS, 121 F.3d 572 (10th Cir. 1997).
178. See Grieveson, 121 F.3d at 573; Lopez-Serrato, 120 F.3d at 272; Anaya, 117 F.34 at 448;
Cisneros-Cabrera, 110 F.3d at 748.
179. See Kershner, 228 F.2d at 142.
180. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
181. 935 F. Supp. 1196 (D.C. Utah 1996).
182. See id at 1201.
183. 120 F.3d 271 (10th Cir. 1997).
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protected right."m Therefore, the INS is under no obligation to notify an alien being
deported of the criminal penalties for re-entry."
B. Convictions and Sentences
Sentencing is another area in which the Tenth Circuit continued its trend of
administrative deference. In United States v. Cabrera-Sosa,'T the court considered
whether a convicticn of illegal drug possession prior to the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse
Act was an aggravated felony. Defendant was deported based on a conviction of
selling cocaine and arrested upon re-entry. He claimed that the definition of
"aggravated felony" does not include offenses prior to the ADAA, which introduced
the definition of aggravated felony."' The court disagreed, holding that defendant's
conviction was an aggravated felony under the ADAA.
In Ngayen v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,' the Tenth Circuit
consid6red whether the BIA was correct in considering an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment as an aggravated felony and denying a petition for relief from
deportation. Petitioner received an indeterminate sentence of three to eight years for
an aggravated felony. The court agreed with the BIA policy of considering
indeterminate sentences as being the maximum sentence imposed and held that the
petitioner was not eligible for waiver of deportation."
Whether a prior conviction for an aggravated felony is an element of section
1326(b)(2) or a condition triggering an enhanced penalty was taken up by the court
in United States v. Valdez.' Section 1326" provides that an alien who has been
convicted and deported and then re-enters the United States shall be fined,
imprisoned, or both. The court noted that the plain language of the statute suggests
that section 1326 i; a sentence enhancement provision and adopted the majority
position.'93
In United States v. Cisneros-Cabrera," the court questioned whether a severe
sentence enhancement was valid even though the state court invalidated the
conviction upon which the enhancement was based. The state court invalidated the
defendant's conviction after he re-entered the United States. The court examined the
statute and determined that it was clear on its face. The defendant triggered the
penalty by re-entry with a valid conviction."" This decision was based on the
184. See id. at 272.
185. See id.
186. 81 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 1996).
187. Id. at 1000.
188. See id. at 1001.
189. 53 F.3d 310 (10th Cir. 1995).
190. See id. at 311.
191. 103 F.3d 95 (10th Cir. 1996).
192. 8 U.S.C. §1326 (1994)
193. See Valdez, 103 F.3d at 97.
194. 110 F.3d 746 (10th Cir. 1997).




previous year's decision in Valdez holding that the statute was a sentence enhan-
cement rather than an element of the crime of re-entry."
The court again addressed whether a prior aggravated felony conviction was an
element of offense or a sentence enhancement in United States v. Anaya.',
Defendant claimed that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his prior
conviction of an aggravated felony. The court upheld its previous holding that a
previous conviction is a sentence enhancement, and not an element of an offense of
illegal re-entry. The court agreed that the district court erred, but concluded that the
error had no bearing on the substantial rights of the party.19
C. Relief from Deportation
A third area in which the Tenth Circuit and district courts within the Tenth Circuit
have evidenced harshness toward deportation of aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies is in judicial review of relief from deportation. The following cases illustrate
both procedural and substantive unwillingness to disrupt administrative decisions.
In Cepero v. Board of Immigration Appeals,' the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas addressed the question of whether an alien may seek
withholding of deportation when convicted of a crime of particular seriousness, when
there is a well-founded ground of persecution in the alien's home country. The court
held that the petitioner was not entitled to relief because he could be deported to a
country in which he would not face persecution. The court further found that an
aggravated felony conviction completely denies the availability of a withholding of
deportation.'
In United States v. Phommachanh, ' the Tenth Circuit was faced with the
problem of whether a district court had the authority to order deportation, as a
condition of supervised release, of a permanent resident alien convicted of an
aggravated felony. The defendant was convicted of carrying a firearm while
committing a crime of violence and ordered deported as a condition of his supervised
release. The Tenth Circuit ruled that this was improper, finding the district court had
the authority instead to turn the defendant over to the INS for deportation.' The
Tenth Circuit cited Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonsecd as
mandating that ambiguities in statutory language must be construed in favor of the
alien.' In doing so, the court found that Congress was explicit in delegating
responsibility between the executive and judicial branches on the issue of depor-
tation. 5
196. See Valdez, 103 F.3d at 97.
197. 117 F.3d 447 (10th Cir. 1997).
198. See id. at 448-49.
199. 882 F. Supp. 1575 (D. Kan. 1995).
200. See id. at 1578-79.
201. 91 F.3d 1383 (10th Cir. 1996).
202. See id. at 1385.
203. 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
204. See Phommachanh, 91 F.3d at 1385.
205. See id. at 1386.
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D. Standing for Appeal
The'final area in which the Tenth Circuit deferred to administrative interpretations
involves the convicted alien's standing for appeal of deportation orders. Recent cases
illustrate that the Tenth Circuit is unwilling to undermine the Attorney General's
decisions.
In Al-Salehi v. hnmigration & Naturalization Service,' the court dealt with the
issue whether there was an absolute bar preventing petitioning for withholding of
deportation. Petitioner's appeal was denied by the immigration judge. The BIA found
that the immigration judge properly determined that petitioner's criminal conviction
conclusively denied his request for relief. The Tenth Circuit agreed, holding that the
administrative construction enforced by the BIA is entitled to deference, regardless
of mitigating circumstances as to the alien's danger to the community.a
In Hernandez-Avalos v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, the court
examined whether an aggravated felon could compel the INS to initiate deportation
proceedings. Four separate alien petitioners argued, based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(I), that
the Attorney General should begin deportation procedures as soon as possible after
conviction.' The Tenth Circuit held that the Immigration and Nationality Tech-
nical Corrections Act of 19940 precluded a private right of action against the
government and against the Attorney General" Additionally, aliens convicted of
deportable offenses were subject to the "zone of interest test"222 to determine if they
had standing to seek mandamus to compel the Attorney General to begin
proceedings. The court concluded that aliens convicted of deportable offenses did
not have standing to seek mandamus.'
In Stolp v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,' the Tenth Circuit examined
whether an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and already deported had standing
to appeal. The INS began deportation proceedings, determining that he was ineligible
for a 212(c) discretionary waiver. Petitioner asked both for review and for a stay of
deportation. The stay was denied and the petitioner was deported. The court held that
because petitioner had already been deported, the court was without jurisdiction to
hear a claim! 6
206. 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995).
207. See id. at 391.
208. 50 F.3d 842 (10th Cir. 1995).
209. "In the case of an alien who is convicted of an offense which makes the alien subject to
deportation, the Attorney General shall begin any deportation proceedings as expeditiously as possible
after the date of conviction." 8 U.S.C. § 1252 historical note (Supp. IV 1998).
210. Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 225, 108 Stat. 4305, 4324 (1994).
211. See Hernandez-Avalos, 50 F.3d at 844.
212. Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1452 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Clarke v.
Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987)) (holding that the test is whether "Congress
intended for a particular class of plaintiffs to be relied upon to challenge agency disregard of the law").
213. See Hernandez-Avalos, 50 F.3d at 847.
214. See id. at 848.





In United States v. Aranda-Hernandez,217 the Tenth Circuit examined whether an
immigration judge's refusal to hear a defendant's asylum and withholding of
deportation claims violated the defendant's right to effective appeal. The defendant
claimed that he was deprived the right of effective appeal when the immigration
judge refused to consider his petition for withholding deportation. The court held that
when there are substantive determinations in an immigration hearing which later
result in a criminal sanction, there must be effective review of the administrative
procedure.2 8 However, the court did not find such abuse in denying the petition and
held that such a refusal did not violate defendant's rights to an effective appeal.2
Whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prohibited appellate
review of a deportation order was taken up by the Tenth Circuit in Grieveson v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service." The INS found the petitioner deportable
because he committed a controlled substance violation. The BIA dismissed his
appeal. Several months after the AEDPA became effective, petitioner filed his
petition for review. The court concluded that his appeal was absolutely barred by the
AEDPA, ' which provides that "any final order of deportation against an alien who
is deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense ... shall not be
subject to review by any court."'
VI. Analysis and Suggestions
Congress has followed a policy of increasingly strict controls on immigration
policy regarding alien criminals. Since 1988, several acts have expanded the
definition of "aggravated felony" to encompass even somewhat trivial offenses, and
have made aggravated felony deportation applicable regardless of when in an alien's
past the crime occurred. Congress also intended to allow no possibility of judicial
review for administrative decisions of deportation. In delegating its authority,
Congress encourages a hardline position against criminal aliens. Because Congress
has plenary power over immigration, one cannot argue that it has abused that power
in denying due process rights to criminal aliens. The courts agree with respect to
substantive due process rights, deferring completely to congressional plenary
power' Congress has been extremely consistent in its policy choices. While crime
may be a significant problem with permanent resident aliens, a categorical approach
of denying to hear mitigating circumstances, such as family hardship, contributions
to society, redemption from criminal life, or potential persecution is unjustified.
Allowing mitigating factors may dull the sharp edge of the current deportation
217. 95 F.3d 977 (10th Cir. 1996).
218. See id. at 980.
219. See id. at 980-81.
220. 121 F.3d 572 (10th Cir. 1997).
221. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(a), 110
Stat. 1214, 1276-77 (1996) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(10)).
222. Grieveson, 121 F.3d at 574 (noting that 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) was repealed by the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996) and replaced by 8 U.S.C. § 1252, though in the present case the pre-IIRAIRA standards applied).
223. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 583.
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statutes with little harmful effect to the law. As it was shown earlier, it is the intent
of Congress that both the range of relief mechanisms be curtailed and that judicial
review be eliminated.
The executive branch has been even harsher towards the alien. Contradictory
policies have forced the INS, the BIA, and the Attorney General into using even
more heavy handed tactics with alien criminals than perhaps even Congress intended.
Disagreements have arisen as to the extent of the waiver provisions, general
disconcem for the surrounding situation and mitigating circumstances of a criminal's
life after his crime, and the temporal applicability of statutes. Although the
administration is overworked, two faults remain: the overall lack of concern for the
alien, and incompn.hensible inconsistency within its policy-making bodies.
Part of the reason for congressional and administrative ill-will towards aliens stems
from a general anti-immigrant sentiment prevalent in the United States." In
addition, this sentiment "blurs the distinction between legal and illegal migration."'
This backlash has prompted Congress to discriminate severely against both legal and
illegal aliens' and has spilled over into recent congressional decisions to restrict
administrative and judicial remedies for aliens facing deportation.' Throughout this
century, America as a whole can be characterized as xenophobic.m
Strictness toward criminality does not seem to constitute fairness toward the alien.
Congress may hav gone too far in reacting to public opinion, denying legitimate
members of the community access to basic rights, such as due process and equal
protection of the laws. All constitutional attacks on congressional decisions seem
fruitless considering Congress' almost absolute plenary power, and would necessitate
overturning almost two hundred years of immigration jurisprudence.
A. Analysis of Possibilities for Relief in the Courts
Generally, court are more sympathetic to the plight of the criminal alien than
Congress has historically been. Courts have tempered the harshness of Congress with
thoughts of procedural due process and minimal protection of judicial review, but
courts are also bound by the wishes of tongress. Only when Congress has over-
stepped its bounds have the courts sought to restrict its actions. This has led to
inconsistency within the courts. Several cases simply repeat administrative decisions
without in-depth analysis, while other cases protect the almost powerless resident
alien convicted of a crime. Generally, courts have held that aliens who are in the
United States, whether legally or clandestinely, enjoy procedural due process rights.
224. See Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81
IOWA L. REV. 707, 709, (1996).
225. Id. at 710.
226. For example, welfare benefits are generally curtailed for legal permanent residents as of 1996.
Id. In addition, trying to claim such benefits often violates the affidavit of support the petitioner must
sign when sponsoring en alien. The alien is not allowed to try for benefits for ten years and is seen as
a public charge and is fnadmissible under INA § 212(a)(4).
227. See Scaperlada, supra note 224, at 710.
228. See RICHARD 0. CURRY & THOMAS M. BROWN, CONSPIRACY: THE FEAR OF SUBVERSION IN




In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the Supreme Court maintained that
"aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only
after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due
process of law."'
Although citizens enjoy certain substantive protections, including freedom from
arbitrary or substantially intrusive invasion by governmental action, in the areas of
substantive due process rights, the courts have not afforded the same protections to
resident aliens. The courts have deferred to the correctness of congressional action,
as illustrated by Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,"' which held that "any policy towards
aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with... foreign relations, the war power,
and the maintenance of a republican form of government." 2 The Supreme Court
maintained that "such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches
of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference. ' 3
The decision virtually eliminates substantive due process arguments for the
noncitizen. It is not clear why the Constitution's Due Process Clause should apply
only in part to resident aliens.
The courts have been inconsistent in the area of Equal Protection claims as well.
Outside the specific framework of immigration law, which is the sole province of the
federal government, when states classify persons solely on the basis of alienage, the
courts claim to review such statutes under the "strict scrutiny" standard.' This is
not unusual, because aliens as a class perhaps meet the "discrete and insular" test,
which triggers the application of strict scrutiny. Aliens are essentially politically
powerless and their class has been traditionally discriminated against, at least as far
back as 1798 with the Alien Act which permitted the President to expel from the
United States any alien whom he deemed dangerous. 5
In spite of seemingly qualifying for protected status, a number of cases have
reduced the test from "strict scrutiny" to "rational basis." In light of the fact that the
Constitution has been interpreted to vest full authority in Congress in the area of
immigration,' it is difficult to rectify the inconsistent policies the courts have taken
with regard to federal legislation as opposed to individual state actions. The solution
lies in the fact that when a state classifies a group in such a way as to disadvantage
aliens, it must be consistent with the federal government's permission for the alien
to reside in the country. In Plyer v. Doe, 7 the Supreme Court held that under the
229. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
230. I. at 212.
231. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
232. Id. at 588-89.
233. Id.
234. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) (holding that states may not prevent resident
aliens from practicing law); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973) (holding that a state may
not bar aliens from holding positions in the state civil service); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382
(1971) (holding that states cannot deny welfare benefits to aliens).
235. See 1 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IM IGRATON LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 2.02-2.04 (Matthew
Bender rev. ed. 1997).
236. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
237. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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Equal Protection Clause, illegal aliens of school age may not be charged a fee for
public school education." The decision rested specifically on whether the state's
ban comported with congressional policy on immigration. 9 In Sugarman v.
Dougall,2 " the Supreme Court made an important exception to this policy, holding
that a state could prevent aliens from holding state elective offices and important
nonelective offices of state government.
It is interesting to note that the Sugarman exception has all but swallowed the rule
for state discrimination. In Foley v. Connelie,"1 the Court extended the Sugarman
exception to state troopers.4' In Ambach v. Norwick,UI the Court extended the
exception to public school teachers.2  And in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, s the
Court extended the exception to deputy probation officers.' The only case in
which the Court did not find the exception applicable was in Bernal v. Fainter,"7
where a resident alien applied to be a notary public. The exception effectively
reduces the burden on state regulation to a "middle scrutiny" or balancing of interests
test, and not the "strict scrutiny" test from Plyer.
In the realm of .ederal action, the courts have taken a different approach, If the
federal classificaticn is only based on alienage, the courts use a balancing test since
the federal goverrmaent has the exclusive responsibility for supervising immigration.
This test balances the federal government's interests in controlling immigration
against the alien's fight to fair treatment. The Court specifically upheld congressional
power to discriminate in Matthews v. Diaz.'" The Court held that Congress could
impose the double requirements that aliens reside in the United States for five years
and be admitted for legal permanent residence before receiving Medicare."'
The wavering of the courts is distressing. At least in part, this wavering may be
attributable to public pressure and anti-immigrant sentiment. Although Congress did
carve out certain minor safeguards within the immigration laws that protect the
aggravated felon in spite of explicit intent to the contrary, the protections are very
narrow. But, for the aggravated felon with certain mitigating factors in his favor,
relief is possible, even when Congress has taken much of judicial review away from
the courts.
The Tenth Circuit, however, adamantly and unwaveringly follows congressional
intent and policy. The court decided several cases from 1995-1997 concerning
immigration law and the rights of a permanent resident alien who is deportable for
238. Id. at 230.
239. See id. at 224-25.
240. 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973).
241. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
242. See id. at 300.
243. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
244. See id. at 81.
245. 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
246. See id. at 447.
247. 467 U.S. 216, 227-28 (1984).
248. 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1976).




having committed an aggravated felony. The court's decisions reflect definite judicial
confirmation of administrative decisions, following the hardline position of Congress.
In every case surveyed, the Tenth Circuit sided against the resident alien, denying
review if convicted of an aggravated felony, holding that there was an absolute
presumption of "dangerousness to the community", affirming that withholding of
deportation was unavailable regardless of mitigating circumstances, and denying
judicial review of administrative decisions.
B. Suggested Possibilities for Relief Under the Immigration and Naturalization Act
There may be other alternatives available under the seemingly onerous congres-
sional policy to the alien facing deportation. Congress has provided several remedies
that may be applicable to the aggravated felon. It is not clear whether these remedies
were intended or whether they are even applicable considering INS's day-to-day
practice' The first potential source of relief is cancellation of removal. INA
section 24OA(b)"' offers cancellation of removal within the discretion of the
Attorney General for those aliens who are either inadmissible or deportable. To
qualify, the alien must have been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of ten years, must have been a person of good moral character for
that same time, the deportation of the alien must be shown to result in extreme and
unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child who is a U.S. citizen, and the
alien must not have been convicted of a crime under section 212(a)(2),'
237(a)(2),P or 237(a)(3).' This leaves a small window of relief for the alien if
he fulfills the conditions above and his aggravated felony was committed before he
entered the United States. Additionally, his aggravated felony must not constitute a
"crime of moral turpitude." This policy rewards the alien for good moral behavior
and contribution to society, but is very narrow.
One problem with this small possibility of relief concerns the definition of "crime
of moral turpitude." It may be possible under immigration law and practice for an
alien to commit what is considered an aggravated felony and for it not be considered
one of moral turpitude. Courts have held that the determination of moral turpitude
is typically applied categorically, and not based on the facts of individual cases.'
A fairly detailed catalog of cases provides a list of crimes which do and do not
involve moral turpitude.' Crimes involving fraud, murder, some aggravated forms
250. One other note must be made. Such minor opportunities of relief, while technically available,
perhaps are not really available to the alien without counsel who has no way of adequately arguing the
law.
251. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (1994).
252. These are criminal and related grounds which involve an act of moral turpitude, a violation of
a controlled substance, a person with multiple convictions, and traffickers in controlled substances. INA
§ 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994).
253. This section lists similar crimes as section 212(a)(2), but with the additional language, "any
alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission." INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1998).
254. Generally this is falsification of documents and fraud. Id. § 237(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3).
255. See Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1031 (8th Cir. 1971).
256. See STEPHEN G. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 442 (1997).
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of assault, and voluntary manslaughter generally involve moral turpitude. Crimes that
do not involve moral turpitude are simple assault and involuntary manslaughter.'
Comparing that list with crimes falling under aggravated felony, 8 some of the
lesser crimes listed as aggravated felonies perhaps do not involve moral turpitude.
Arguably, there is a small chance of success, but only for a very limited type of case
and even then, peThaps only for the alien with an extremely sympathetic case.
A second possibility for relief along the same lines of analysis as above is under
INA section 240A(b)(3) - adjustment of status. The requirements for the
Attorney General'; adjustment are the same as for section 240A(b)(1), but are limited
by an annual 4000 maximum on adjustments and cancellations for the year.'
Whether adjustment of status benefits an alien is questionable, however. If an alien
is already deportable on the grounds of an aggravated felony, adjusting his status may
have no effect. Circumstances may, however, provide a more compelling case under
one category 'of resident alien than under another, such as by adjusting to legal
permanent resident based on an immediate family relationship.
Another route to adjustment of status is INA section 245."s An alien may adjust
his status if he is eligible to receive an immigrant visa, is admissible for permanent
residence, and an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his
application is filecl. The major hurdle is the admissibility requirement. If a person
is excludable under section 212(a), then such relief is not available. Section 212(a)(2)
contains the criminal grounds for inadmissibility. The conviction, admittance of a
conviction, or commission of the acts which are the elements of a crime of moral
turpitude or controlled substance violation make an alien inadmissible. This is
modified by section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iii), which makes exception in two circumstan-
ces: first, if the crime was committed when the alien was under eighteen and more
than five years before the application, and second, if the maximum penalty for the
crime did not exceed one year and the actual sentence imposed was less than six
months.' If the aggravated felony does not constitute moral turpitude or if it meets
the criteria in section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iii), the alien is admissible, and thus eligible
for adjustment of status. Again, this is a narrow window.
A third type of relief for the alien convicted of an aggravated felony is registry
under INA section 249. The permanent registry relief is for aliens having entered the
United States prior to January 1, 1972, having continuous residence since that entry,
having good moral character, and who are not ineligible for citizenship nor
inadmissible under INA section 212(a) for having committed certain crimes of moral
turpitude (with some exceptions for length of sentences.) If the alien can convince
the Attorney General that an aggravated felony committed long ago does not fall
within section 212 and the alien meets the other requirements, relief may be
257. See id.
258. See INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. IV 1998).
259. See id. § 240A(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b).
260. See id.
261. See id. § 24.5, 8 U.S.C. § 1255.
262. See id.




available. This provision generally rewards those who have lived in the United States
for a long time and have become an essential part of the community. This provision
also has a less stringent requirement for continuous residence than does cancellation
of removal, thus increasing the availability for relief, even in the case of the
aggravated felon.
A final form of lasting relief is a private bill or legislation which provides
permanent resident status to an individual when he otherwise would not be eligible.
Since Congress has plenary power over immigration, it can make any law admitting
any individual alien, even when the alien is inadmissible under the INA. The overall
number of bills introduced and subsequently passed has dramatically fallen within the
last few years, ' but success is still possible if the case is particularly sym-
pathetic.' Formal rules lay out the procedure and substantive criteria for such
petitions.'
A number of nonpermanent forms of relief may be available to the aggravated
felon. The first of these is deferred action, though it is inapplicable if removal
proceedings have already begun. The INS does not always institute removal
proceedings for everyone it suspects of being deportable. 7 In cases in which
extraordinary and sympathetic factors would make removal unconscionable, the INS
often does not initiate such proceedings. However, the INS Operations Instruction
24.1A(22), which gave the district director discretion to defer action if various
conditions are met, such as how likely the alien is to depart on his own, the
likelihood another country will take the alien, the age or health of the alien, adverse
publicity, and high enforcement priority, such as for terrorists or war criminals, has
since been rescinded.'
Another option for relief from deportation may exist in voluntary departure under
INA section 240B. Voluntary departure is used by an immigration judge in exchange
for not formally ordering removal. The Attorney General has the discretion to permit
the alien to depart voluntarily if he is not subject to 237(a)(2)(A)(iii),270 which
specifically concerns aggravated felonies committed after admission. The only way
for voluntary departure to be applicable is for the crime to have been committed
before admission. Voluntary departure also prevents a twenty-year bar to readmission
due to removal proceedings on the basis of an aggravated felony upon the alien's
return to the United States.2
Congress provided two opportunities for voluntary departure. Section 240B(a)
allows for departure, before or in lieu of removal proceedings, for those convicted
264. See DAVID WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 88-95 (3d ed.
1992).
265. See LEGOMSKY, surpa note 256, at 504.
266. See House, Senate, Subcommittees Approve New Rules for Private Immigration Bills, 70
INTERPRE'ER RELEASES 591, 597-603 (May 3, 1993).
267. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 256, at 504.
268. See id.
269. INS Operations Instructions, 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a)(22) (1993).
270. See INA § 240B(A)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
271. See id. § 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
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of aggravated felonies, assuming the above criteria are met.' Section 240B(b)
authorizes voluntary departure at the conclusion of the removal hearing,2" though
it is slightly more restrictive."4 Congress has also barred all judicial review of
orders denying voluntary departure 5 Congress additionally gave the Attorney
General the authority to limit eligibility for voluntary departure under 240B(e), which
effectively gives the Attorney General the power to add further restrictions and bars
judicial review of any regulationsl 6
Finally, the alien may request a stay of removal. This is subject to the INS's
discretion under 8 C.F.R. section 2 4 3 .4.' However, removal must be stayed while
a motion to reopen is pending, or the motion is deemed withdrawn." This has only
a limited effect, postponing deportation pending a petition to reopen.
Conclusion
Criminal conduct carries many consequences for the permanent resident alien in
the United States. Aside from being a ground for inadmissibility or deportability,
criminal activity may completely eliminate the alien's right to affirmative relief from
removal, even for cases of extreme hardship or extraordinary circumstances. Since
the 1980s, Congress has focused particular attention on criminal aliens, expanding
removal grounds, decreasing and in some cases entirely removing the availability of
discretionary relief, expediting the procedures involved in some criminal removal
procedures, and removing judicial review of decisions of executive agencies.
The matter is further complicated by the number of actors involved in making im-
migration policy. Congress, the executive branch, and the courts actively participate
in various aspects of immigration. Congress determines immigration law, the
Departments of State and Justice carry out the bulk of congressional wishes, and the
courts review the constitutionality of the actions of both branches. Very often, the
particular agendas of each branch do not coincide, and often they pursue contradic-
tory policies. The history of removal law since 1988, and specifically the definition
of aggravated felony since 1988, has evidenced an increasing intolerance for criminal
activity, especially activity amongst the resident alien population. Legislative activity
within the last decade, in response to the rise in alien criminal population in United
States prisons, has additionally disfavored the resident alien convicted of aggravated
felonies. Administrative decisions have evidenced equal harshness against the
resident alien. In aldition, the indeterminacy of direct policy - swinging from rigid
adherence to legislative intent to acceptance of extraordinary cases that necessitate
against the strict application of deportation proceedings - has made for very
272. See iU § 240B(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c).
273. See iUL
274. Bond is mandatory and not discretionary. Id. § 240B(b)(3). The maximum period allowed to
depart is 60 days and not 120. hL § 240B(b)(2).
275. See id. § 24CB(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).
276. See LEGOMSCY, surpa note 256, at 509.
277. 8 C.F.R. § 243.4 (1996).




unpredictable patterns within the administration. The judiciary has hesitated to
support wholeheartedly congressional desire, trying rather to balance the due process
rights of resident aliens with congressional ill will. The Tenth Circuit in particular
demonstrates the impact national decisions in the three branches of government have
in regional areas such as Oklahoma. Congress did leave some room for relief, though
effectiveness of such relief is not guaranteed and the alien must have a very
compelling case. The challenge is to balance congressional wishes and the demands
on the executive branch with the limited protections available.
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